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In recent years, it has become commonplace for comparativists to emphasize 
the resilience of welfare states in advanced capitalist societies, and the failure 
of neo-liberal efforts to dismantle the welfare state. This paper takes issue with 
some of the tenets of the resilience thesis. We argue that a sharp deceleration of 
social spending has occurred in most OECD countries since 1980, and that 
welfare states have failed to offset the rise of market-generated inequality and 
insecurity. Also, we stress the distributive and political consequences of 





















































































































































































The goal of this paper is to provide a balanced assessment of what has 
happened to the welfare state in advanced capitalist societies over the last 15- 
20 years. What are we to make of recent spending cuts and welfare reforms? 
Do they represent a fundamental rollback of the welfare activities of the state, 
and thus a belated victory for Thatcherite-Reaganite ideas? Or should these 
changes rather be seen as incremental adjustments of mature welfare states, 
proven to be more enduring than their critics?
Already in the 1970s, many scholarly observers concluded that the 
welfare state had reached its outer limits and began to speak of a crisis of the 
welfare state. The rhetoric of crisis was inspired by the idea, shared by neo- 
marxists and neo-liberals, that the redistributive logic of the welfare state 
contradicted the logic of capitalism, and that the welfare activities of the state 
would have to be rolled back or reconfigured so as to conform to the needs of 
capitalism. With neo-liberal ideas gaining ascendancy in both the U.K and the 
U.S. at the onset of the 1980s, the fate of the welfare state appeared to be 
sealed. In retrospect, however, it is clear that Thatcher’s and Reagan's 
achievements in the realm of welfare reform fell short of what their rhetoric led 
us to expect. Against this background, the resilience of the welfare state has 
emerged as a prominent theme in the scholarly literature of the 1990s. Even the 
Economist (September 20, 1997) has recently picked up on this theme, 
bemoaning the fact that government spending, as a percentage of GDP, has not 
declined noticeably in any of the OECD countries.
We argue that proponents of the resilience thesis overlook important 
developments and that some of the evidence they present can be read 
differently. Without resurrecting the crisis rhetoric of the 1970s and its 
functionalist premises, we emphasize that major changes have indeed occurred 
in the scope and organization of public welfare provision not only in the U.K. 
and the U.S., but across the OECD area. Paul Pierson's (1996) World Politics 
article, entitled "The New Politics of the Welfare State," will serve as a foil for 
this discussion. Widely cited, Pierson's article provides, we think, the clearest 
and most compelling presentation of the case for welfare-state resilience.1 
Based on aggregate OECD statistics as well as case studies of Germany, 
Sweden, the U.K. and the U.S., Pierson argues that welfare cutbacks and 
reforms have been strictly limited in scope. At the same time, he observes, "the 
power of organized labor and left parties has shrunk considerably in many 
advanced industrial societies" (Pierson 1996:150). Together, these observations 
pose a challenge for the power resource model developed by Walter Korpi 
(1983) and others to explain cross-national variations in welfare-state 
development. As Pierson would have it, the politics of welfare-state 
retrenchment appear to be fundamentally different from the politics of welfare- 
state expansion.
Pierson advances three arguments to explain welfare-state resilience. 
First, he argues that "the welfare state now represents the status quo, with all 
the political advantages that this status confers" (174). Especially in countries 



























































































difficult. Secondly, Pierson argues that welfare cutbacks tend to be associated 
with high electoral costs for the simple reason that basic welfare programs 
enjoy widespread popular legitimacy. Thirdly, he attributes resilience to 
successful mobilization by well-organized groups representing the interests of 
consumers of welfare benefits (such as retirees) as well as employees of the 
welfare state. The combination of these factors yields a politics of blame 
avoidance in which cutbacks can only take place through incremental and 
surreptitious mechanisms or during moments of extraordinary fiscal stress and 
political consensus.
One of Pierson’s major contributions is to insist on the need to 
disaggregate the welfare state, and to analyze change within specific social 
policy programs. Pierson suggests that the arguments set out above not only 
explain the general phenomenon of welfare-state resilience, but also explain 
why some welfare programs have been cut more than others. Here, too, a 
central feature of Pierson's analysis is the claim that concentrated interests will 
prevail over more diffuse and less well-organized constituencies.
At many points in Pierson’s discussion, the thorny question of how we 
should distinguish radical change from incremental adjustments arises. For 
instance, writing about Sweden in the early 1990's. Pierson (1996:171) tells us 
that conditions were uniquely favorable to a "complete overhaul of social 
policy," but even so "there was no sign that the welfare state would be radically 
restructim d " Exactly what, then, would a "complete overhaul of social policy” 
or a "radical restructuring of the welfare state" entail? And should we not allow 
for some outcomes that are neither "incremental adjustments" nor "complete 
overhauls"? While Pierson's discussion leaves something to be desired on this 
score, we wish to avoid a lengthy conceptual discussion. Essentially, we want 
to make five points. The first point is that recent cutbacks and welfare reforms 
should be situated in the context of rising social inequality and insecurity. 
Since the late 1970s, the dynamics of advanced capitalism have been undoing 
some of the postwar achievements of welfare states. Increased welfare efforts 
would have been required to maintain these achievements.
Our second point is that the retrenchment literature to date deals 
primarily with the experience of the 1980s. As we update the qualitative and 
quantitative evidence presented by Pierson, the resilience thesis becomes less 
compelling. Our third point concerns quantitative measures of welfare effort 
and the size of the public sector. We argue that Pierson's measures are flawed 
because they are based on a GDP denominator and fail to take into changes in 
societal welfare needs. Addressing these two problems, the alternative 
measures that we propose show that the rapid growth of social spending in the 
1960s and 1970s came to an end in the 1980s, and that public services were 
more affected the deceleration of growth thai transfer programs. Measuring the 
welfare state in terms of the absolute size of the public-sector labor force, we 




























































































This last observation leads directly to our fourth point: the retrenchment 
literature exemplified by Pierson's work focuses on the question of the extent to 
which welfare entitlements have changed and tends to ignore the question of 
changes in the delivery of social services or, in other words, the question of 
how the public sector is organized. While Pierson does discuss health care, 
most of the entitlement programs that he considers are based on transfer 
payments. At least in Sweden and the U.K., however, it is in the realm of public 
services that we find the most significant cutbacks and market-oriented 
reforms. Related to this, finally, summing up changes in individual social 
programs does not provide the basis for an adequate assessment of what has 
happened to welfare states over the last 10-15 years. We must also consider 
changes in the overall configuration of the welfare state, e.g., how the 
allocation of resources among individual programs might have changed. Thus 
we propose to explore not only "welfare-state retrenchment"—a term which 
implies that the welfare state might be shrinking, expanding, or holding steady- 
-but also "welfare-state restructuring."
The importance that we assign to the public sector as a site of service 
production follows from Esping Andersen's (1990) well-known and much- 
admired comparative analysis of welfare-state development. As Esping- 
Andersen points out, the Scandinavian welfare states are distinguished by their 
reliance on the direct provision of services. Yet state-produced services 
constitute a crucial dimension of the public provision of social welfare in 
virtually all advanced capitalist societies these days. And, to the extent that it 
involves non-profit production and allocation of output according to political 
criteria, it is this dimension of the welfare state that contradicts the logic of 
capitalism most directly.2
By way of conclusion, we will present some arguments intended to 
explain the patterns of welfare-state restructuring that we observe. It should 
already be clear, however, that the purpose of this paper is not to test causal 
claims. Our debate with Pierson is about the meaning of recent developments. 
This type of debate is an essential complement to the social science tradition 





























































































In this section, we present descriptive statistics to support the propositions that 
inequality among wage-earners has increased and that security of employment 
and income has diminished for many wage-earners in advanced capitalist 
societies since 1980.' Without denying their existence, the literature that 
emphasizes the resilience of the welfare state tends to ignore these trends. 
Pierson and others seem to take the view that the growth of inequality and 
insecurity is only relevant to the extent that these societal trends are a direct 
result of spending cuts or reforms of the welfare state. In other words, they 
confine their discussion to the question of the extent to which the welfare state 
has become less redistributive or less effective in providing protection against 
market risks. This view fails to incorporate Esping-Andersen's (1990) crucial 
insight that the activities of the welfare state influences the way that labor 
markets operate. To use the language of public economics, the public provision 
of social welfare may affect not only the distribution of "disposable income" 
(post-tax, post-transfer income), but also the distribution of "primary income." 
Similarly, welfare-state activities may affect the rate of unemployment as well 
as the social implications of unemployment.
More importantly for our present purposes, the context of rising 
inequality and insecurity must be considered when we assess the significance 
of recent changes in the size and character of welfare states. For example, 
Swedish governments lowered the replacement rate of unemployment 
insurance from 90% to 75% in the first half of the 1990s. Had unemployment 
remained what it had been in the 1980s, these decisions might well have been 
described as a minor retrenchment of the welfare state. In the context of the 
dramatic increase of i.employment that occurred in the early 1990s, they take 
on a different significance.
It is commonplace to measure the distribution of income in terms of the 
ratio of income at the lower end of the 90th percentile (the lower end of the top 
10% of income earners) to income at the upper end of the 10th percentile (the 
upper end of the bottom 10%). Referring to wage income among full-time 
employees, Table 1 summarizes trends in 90-10 ratios from the late 1970s to 
the mid-1990s in all OECD countries for which comparable data are available. 
For men and women combined, wage inequality has increased shaiply in the 
Netherlands, the U.K. and the U.S. Most other countries have experienced 
moderate increases of both-gender wage inequality, but a handful of countries, 
most notably Germany, have bucked the general trend. The trend towards 
increased inequality becomes more pronounced when we take gender 
differentials out of the picture. For all but one country (Belgium), the 90-10 
ratio for men has increased since the early 1980s and, in most countries, the 
increase of the 90-10 ratio for men has be;n significantly greater than the 
increase of the 90-10 ratio for both sexes. Generally speaking, rising within- 
gender inequality has partially been offset by the continuation of the reduction 





























































































Table 1. Wage dispersion among full-time employees, as measured by 90-10 
ratios, 1979-1995.
both sexes men only
earliest latest % change earliest latest % change
ASL 2.74 (79) 2.92 (95) +6.6% 2.73 (79) 2.94 (95) +7.7%
AUS 3.45 (80) 3.66 (94) +6.1 2.64 (80) 2.72 (89) +3.0
BEL 2.39(86) 2.24 (93) -6.3 1.94 (85) 1.90(93) -2.1
CAN 4.01 (81) 4.20 (94) +4.7 3.46(81) 3.77 (94) +9.0
DEN 2.14(80) 2.17(90) + 1.4
FIN 2.46 (80) 2.38 (94) -3.3 2.44 (80) 2.53 (94) +3.7
FRA 3.24 (79) 3.28 (95) + 1.2 3.39(79) 3.43 (95) + 1.2
GER 2.69 (83) 2.32(93) -13.8 2.19(83) 2.25 (93) +2.7
ITA 2.94 (79) 2.80 (93) -4.8 2.29 (79) 2.64(93) + 15.3
JPN 3.01 (79) 3.02 (94) +0.3 2.59 (79) 2.77 (94) +6.9
NTH 2.21 (85) 2.59 (94) + 17.2 2.21 (85) 2.29 (94) +3.6
NOR 2.06 (80) 1.98 (91) -3.9
NZL 2.89 (84) 4.04 (94) -3.9 2.72(84) 3.16(94) + 16.2
SWE 2.04 (80) 2.13(93) +4.4 2.11 (80) 2.20 (93) +4.3
SWI 2.72 (91) 2.72 (95) 0.0 2.44(91) 2.54 (95) +4.1
UKM 2.79(79) 3.31 (95) + 18.6 2.45 (79) 3.24 (95) +32.2
USA 4.75 (79) 5.40 (95) + 13.7 4.71 (79) 5.56(95) + 18.0
Note: The 90-10 ratio is the ratio of earnings at the lower end of the 90th percentile (the lower 
end of the top 10% of wage earners) to earnings at the upper end of the 10th percentile 
(bottom 10%). The Belgian figures for men only refer to 80-10 rather than 90-10 ratios: thus 
they should only be compared to those of other countries in terms of change over time.




























































































The figures in Table 1 capture only part of the tendency for market 
forces to generate more inequality since 1980. Several other considerations 
must be introduced to complete the picture. First, disparities of income from 
capital have undoubtedly reinforced the effects of these trends in the 
distribution of wage income. Secondly, the individual-level trends shown in 
Table 1 have likely been magnified by the pooling of wage income within 
families. For the U.S., Gary Burtless (1996) shows that the correlation 
between the incomes of spouses has increased very significantly (i.e., well- 
paid men are increasingly likely to be married to well-paid women) and that 
this development accounts for a large part of the growth of household 
inequality.
Thirdly, the figures presented in Table 1 understate the rise of 
inequality because they are restricted to full-time employees. In virtually all 
OECD countries, the incidence of part-time employment increased from 
1983 to 1993 and in ten countries it increased by more than half (see OECD 
1997:177). Typically, part-time employees earn less than full-time 
employees on an hourly basis and enjoy fewer benefits and, since part-time 
employment is heavily concentrated among women, its expansion requires 
us to qualify the proposition that pay differentials based on gender have 
continued to decline through the 1980s. It is not clear that this proposition 
still holds when we add part-timers to the picture. Finally, data on the 
distribution of income from employment fail to capture the impact of 
unemployment. Because unemployment tends to be concentrated among 
unskilled, low-paid workers, it correlates negatively with wage inequality as 
measured in Table 1 (Rueda and Pontusson 1997). As the rate of 
unemployment increases, low-paid workers disappear from the population 
used to calculate 90-10 ratios and the wage distribution becomes more 
compressed. Obviously, this does not mean that unemployment promotes 
social equality. Being concentrated among low-paid workers and invariably 
associated with income loss, unemployment is perhaps the most important 
source of the new inequality in advanced capitalist societies.
The incidence of poverty provides another obvious indicator of social 
inequality and insecurity. In the U.S., the percentage of the population below 
the poverty line fell from 22% in 1960 to less than 12% in 1973-79, and then 
began to rise, reaching 16-17% in the early 1990s (Blank 1997:55). From a 
comparative perspective, the rate of poverty in the U.S. is uniquely high, but 
the fact that the percentage of the population receiving some form of means- 
tested social assistance increased in all but three OECD countries from 1980 
to 1992 suggests that a general tendency for poverty to rise emerged in this 
period (Gough et al 1997:24-27).J The pervasiveness of recent inegalitarian 
trends is indeed striking, especially in view of the strong tendency among 
students of comparative political economy U emphasize national diversity. 
We hasten to add that common trends do not necessarily add up to cross­
national convergence, for convergence requires that the most egalitarian 
countries experience the most rapid growth of wage inequality, poverty, etc. 




























































































Labor economists typically explain the trend towards increased wage 
inequality in terms of some combination of structural unemployment, 
immigration, trade with low-wage countries, technology-driven shifts in 
demand for labor, and the slower growth of higher education (see Gottschalk 
and Smeeding 1997). Changes in labor-market institutions-deunionization 
and employer-initiated decentralization of wage bargaining—have also 
played an important role in the growth of wage inequality since 1980s 
(Pontusson 1998, Rueda and Pontusson 1997). In the first instance, the 
growth of market inequality should be seen as exogenous to welfare-state 
restructuring. Yet it is highly relevant to our assessment of what has 
happened to advanced welfare states in recent years. While the redistributive 
effects of taxation and welfare spending were broadly consistent with labor 
market trends in the 1960s, labor market conditions changed profoundly in 
the wake of the international recessions of the 1970s. To maintain the 
disposable income distribution that had been achieved by the late 1970s, a 
significant expansion of redistributive welfare state activities would have 
had to occur in the 1980s.
does not appear to have been the case.
The Size of the Welfare State
For the four countries which he chooses to survey (Germany, Sweden, the 
U K. and the U.S.), Pierson (1990:158-159) presents aggregate OECD 
statistics on the evolution of (a) social security transfers as a percentage of 
GDP, (b) total government outlays as a percentage of GDP, and (c) 
government employment as a peicentage of total employment. In Pierson's 
words, the quantitative data he presents show "a surprisingly high level of 
continuity and stability... for none of the countries does the evidence reveal a 
sharp curtailment of the public sector" (cf. also Esping-Andersen 1996a: 10- 
11). This is indeed a judicious assessment of the data presented, but the data 
are problematic on several counts. In what follows, we propose some 
alternative measure of the size of the welfare state and present an overview 
of recent trends in Pierson’s lour countries that is, we think, more 
informative than the one that Pierson presents.'
There are four data-related problems with Pierson's quantitative 
analysis. First, none of his measures capture what is commonly meant by the 
"welfare state." As defined by the OECD, "social security transfers" include 
most transfers to individuals (or households) other than public 
unemployment and health insurance benefits. This, then, leaves out the 
service components of the welfare state. On the other hand, "total 
government outlays" include the full range of state activities, many of which 
have little to do with the provision of social welfare. Secondly, two of 
Pierson s three time series end in 1990 and thus do not capture more recent 
trends. Thirdly, the use of GDP as the denominator of government spending 




























































































makes it difficult to interpret cahnge over time. In the time series presented 
by Pierson, two things are changing—the amount of money spent by the 
government and the size of GDP—and it is impossible to sepaiale one from 
the other.
Finally, Pierson’s quantitative analysis does not take into account 
socio-economic and demographic changes. Since the 1970s, the number of 
welfare-state claimants has increased in all OECD countries as a result of 
mass unemployment, rising poverty and population aging. At any given 
level of entitlement provisions, an increase in the number of unemployed, 
poor or retired people automatically generates an increase of social spending 
by the government. Indeed, increased spending might be associated with a 
reduction of entitlements. To use government spending as a proxy for 
"welfare effort," we must somehow control for these demographic variables 
(cf. Stephens, Huber and Ray 1996, and Cusack 1997).
Providing data on total social spending, an as-yet-unpublished OECD 
paper (OECD 1996c) enables us to address the first of the problems 
mentioned above. However, this data set ends in 1993, and so the problem of 
datedness remains. In Tables 2A-D, we eliminate the GDP denominator 
problem by expressing total social spending and social security transfers in 
terms of constant US dollars (at 1990 prices and exchange rates) and take 
societal needs into account by relating these figures to the number of 
welfare-state claimants. There are three readily-measurable categories of 
welfare-state claimants: (a) retired people (here defined as people above the 
age of 65); (b) unemployed people; and (c) recipients of means-tested social 
assistance. Summing these three categories to arrive at an estimate of the 
total population of welfare-state claimants involves some "double-counting," 
for retired and unemployed people may also be recicipients of social 
assistance. On the other hand, there are obviously people who need public 





























































































Table 2. Absolute levels of social spending (millions), spending per welfare 
claimant and GDP per capita in US$ at 1990 prices and exchange rates.
a) Sweden:







total social spending 20.0 46.6 57.3 83.0 + 133.0 +44.9
social security transfers 13.5 32.6 33.0 52.4 + 141.5 +58.8
total per claimant (a+b) 18,018 32,702 39,764 46.919 +81.5 + 18.0
total per claimant (a+b+c) 32,173 35,199 +9.4
transfers per claimant (b+c) 19,469 24,682 +26.8









total social spending 180.6 328.1 473.6 +81.7 +44.3
social security transfers 120.3 215.1 257.1 +78.8 + 19.5
total per claimant (a+b) 22,340 31.433 39,990 +40.7 +27.2
total per claimant (a+b+c) 25,555 29,218 + 14.3
transfers per claimant (b+c) 18,009 18,202 + 1.1









total social spending 70.1 137.1 216.9 +95.6 +580
social security transfers 51.6 83.9 137.0 +62.6 +63.3
total per claimant (a+b) 9,396 13,857 18.327 +47.6 +32.2
total per claimant (a+b+c) 9,303 10,473 + 12.5
transfers per claimant (b+c) 6,340 7,594 + 19.8




































































































total social spending 286.5 542 5 868.7 +89.5 +60.1
social security transfers 201.5 454.2 731.8 + 125.4 +611
total per claimant (a+b) 12,963 16,274 20,899 +25.5 +28.4
total per claimant (a+b+c) 7,724 10,070 +30.4
transfers per claimant (b+c) 7,252 9.519 +31.3
GDP per capita 15,685 18,464 21,873 + 17.7 + 18.5
Categories of claimants: 
a = unemployed; 
b = aged 65+;
c = social assistance recipients.
Sources:
total social spending as % of GDP: OECD (1996c); 
social security transfers as % of GDP: OECD (1996b);
GDP in US$ at 1990 prices and exchange rates: OECD (1996d): 
size of population, % aged and size of labor force: OECD (1994a); 
unemployment rate: OECD (1996b);
social assistance recipients as % of population: Gough et al (1997).
In Tables 2A-D, we present two measures of total social spending per 
welfare-state claimant: one for the sum of all three categories of claimants 
(a+b+c) and one for the sum of unemployed and retired people only (a+b). 
We do this in recognition of the double-counting problem, but also so as to 
be able to compare the growth of spending from 1980 to 1992 with the 
preceding twelve years. (1980 and 1992 are the only two years for which we 
have data enabling us to calculate the n tmber of social assistance 
recipients). As social security transfers do not include unemployment 
insurance benefits, our per-claimant measure of this type of social spending 
is based on the sum of retired people and social assistance recipients (b+c).
When social assistance recipients are included in our estimate of the 
population of welfare-state claimants, we find that total social spending per 
claimant increased very little in real terms from 1980 to 1992 in Germany, 
Sweden and the U.K. Germany registered the highest increase of these 
countries (14.5%), corresponding to a growth rate of slightly more than 1% 
per year. In Germany and the U.K., the increase of total social spending per 
claimant was less than half the increase of real GDP per capita over this 
period. In Sweden, total social spending per claimant held up better relative 
to GDP per capita, but only because the growth of GDP per capita was more 
sluggish. When social assistance recipients are not included in our estimate 
of the population of welfare-state claimants, we observe a much greater 




























































































countries (greater than the increase of GDP per capita in both Germany and 
Sweden). However, the increase over the preceding twelve years (1968-80) 
was much greater still by this measure, especially in the Swedish case.6 
Comparing the change in absolute levels of social spending (rather than 
spending per claimant) from 1980 to 1992 with the change from 1968 to 
1992, we also observe a sharp deceleration of welfare-state expansion in the 
1980s.
On a year-by-year basis, the deceleration of social spending per 
claimant might very well take the form of a downward trend from the mid- 
1980s onwards. Be that as it may, the figures for Germany, Sweden and the 
U.K.. in Tables 2A-C call into question the way that Pierson seems to 
conflate "continuity" with "stability." Clearly, there has been no decline of 
social spending in these countries and thus we might say that spending 
patterns have been stable, but discontinuity (from the 1970s to 1980s) is a 
prominent feature of these patterns.
The U.S. experience (Table 2D) stands out as quite exceptional. 
Whether or not social assistance recipients are included, social spending per 
claimant increased much more rap. dly from 1980 to 1992 in the U.S. than in 
any of the European countries. Moreover, the deceleration of social spending 
growth in the 1980s is less pronounced in the U.S. case. On a per-claimant 
basis, the growth of total social spending was actually greater from 1980 to 
1992 than from 1968 to 1980. As the real value of the benefits provided by 
social assistance programs, such as Food Stamps and AFDC, declined and 
eligibility for these programs was restricted in the 1980s (Alber 1996), the 
rapid growth of spending per claimant in the U.S. primarily reflects the costs 
of Social Security, Medicare and Medicaid. The distinctiveness of the U.S. 
experience also reflects the fact that U.S. unemployment was exceptionally 
high around 1980, and comparatively low around 1992.
Except in the case of Germany, government spending on social 
security grew more rapidly than total social spending from 1980 to 1992. As 
overall spending has slowed down while the costs of social assistance and 
social security entitlements have continued to grow, the service components 
of the welfare state have tended to be squeezed. For the larger set of 
seventeen OECD countries, the data on the real growth of final government 
expenditures in Table 3 corroborates this story. "Final government 
consumption expenditure" refers to the costs of goods and services produced 
by the public sector. Like total government outlays, this measure 
encompasses a range of government activities that have little or nothing to 
do with the provision of social welfare, but it speaks more directly to the size 
of the "public sector" (in the narrow and conventional sense of this term). In 
all but two countries, the average growth rate of real government final 
consumption in was lower in 1973-79 than in 1960-73 and, again, in all but 
two countries, the average rate in 1979-89 was lower than in 1973-79. In a 
handful of countries, the growth of government final consumption rose in 




























































































rates in the 1980s For every single country, the growth rate of 1989-94 was 
lower than that of 1973-79 as well as 1960-73.
Table 3. Average annual rate of growth of real government final consumption 
expenditure, 1960-94.
1960-73 1973-79 1979-89 1989-94
ASL 5.8 4.9 3.4 2.8
AUS 3.2 3.9 1.5 2.3
BEL 5.5 3.7 0.5 0.9
CAN 6.1 3.5 2.5 l.l
DEN 5.8 4.1 1.5 0.8
FIN 5.4 4.8 3.5 -0.1
FRA 4.0 3.4 2.3 2.6
GER 4.5 3.0 1.3 1.7
1TA 4.0 2.7 2.6 0.9
Jf'N 5.8 4.8 2.7 2.1
NTH 2.8 3.5 2.0 1.2
NZL 3.6 3.2 1.2 -0.2
NOR 5.9 5.3 3.5 3.1
SWE 4.9 3.7 1.6 0.9
SWI 5.3 1.4 2.7 1.1
UKM 2.7 1.8 1.0 1.5
USA 2.5 1.7 2.7 0.1
OECD total 3.6 2.8 2.4 1.2
OECD-Europe 4.0 3.2 2.1 1.8
Source: OECD (1996b).
As suggested by Pierson, the size of the public sector might also be 
measured in terms of employment. Again, we must beware of the 
denominator problem here: from 1990 to 1994, the public-sector labor force 
in Sweden declined by nearly 12%, but total employment declined even 
more, and so government employment as a percentage of total employment 
actually increased slightly. For our seventeen countries, Table 4 tracks the 
evolution of the public-sector labor force, measured in absolute terms 
(people) rather than relative terms (percentage of total employment). For 
nine of these countries, the continuous deceleration story of Table 3 here 
becomes a story of outright shrinkage of the public sector. Most remarkably, 
the size of the public-sector labor force declined by nearly 30% in the U.K. 
from 1988 to 1994. (As state-owned corporations are not included in the 
OECD measure of government employment, privatization accounts for only 




























































































Table 4. The size of the public-sector labor force, 1960-94.




average annual % change
1980 peak 1994 1960-73 1973-79 1979-89 1989-94
ASL 1,604 1,843 (87) 1,661 -9.9% 3.0 2.6 0.9 -1.6
AUS 596 837 2.3 3.4 1.9 2.7
BEL 701 755(86) 730 -3.3 2.1 3.3 0.7 -0.5
CAN 2,027 2,646 2.0 2.3 1.8
DEN 708 812(90) 792 -2.5 4.8 1.7 -0.4
FIN 398 550(91) 514 -6.5 4.6 4.8 2.7 -1.2
FRA 3,395 5,426 2.8 1.7 1.4
GER 3,843 4,329 (92) 4,307 -0.5 3.7 2.3 1.0 0.2
ITA 3,151 3,415 (92) 3,374 -1.2 2.7 1.4 0.0
JPN 3,654 3,807 2.5 1.9 0.2 0.4
NTH 756 858(90) 835 -2.7 1.7 2.3 0.5 -0.8
NZL 2.3 2.5
NOR 419 613 5.4 2.5 2.6
SWE 1,299 1,425 (90) 1,256 -11.9 5.6 4.9 1.3 -2.1
SWI 323 424 3.8 2.8 1.6 1.8
UKM 5,210 5,328 (88) 3,789 -28.9 1.7 1.5 -0.2 -6.1
USA 16,732 18,049 2.7 1.5 1.2 1.2
OECD total 2.7 2.2 l.l 0.1





























































































Given that only some government employees are engaged in the 
activities that we associate with the welfare state, to what extent do the 
employment cuts documented in Table 4 pertain to the public provision of 
social welfare? As far as Sweden is concerned, there is no evidence to 
suggests that welfare activities have been spared from employment cuts. 
Quite the contrary, employment in public health and hospitals fell by 7% and 
employment in care for children and the elderly fell by 10%, while 
employment in education and defense each fell by 4% from 1990 to 1993 
(Ringqvist 1996:111-113). As Table 5 shows, the shrinkage of the public- 
sector labor force has been highly differentiated in the British case. The 
largest employment cuts by far have been sustained by central government 
agencies other than the NHS and the military, and the number of people 
employment by local government authorities in social services actually 
increased from 1985 to 1994 (along with the number of people employed in 
the police forces). All of this might be taken as evidence that overall 
employment data overstate the extent of welfare-state shrinkage. On the 
other hand, the category "other central government" encompasses some 
welfare activities, and employment in both education and the NHS did 
shrink significantly over this period.
Table 5. Government employment (000's of full-time equivalents) in the U.K., 
1985 and 1994.
1985 1994 % change
central government
armed forces 326 250 -23.3%
NHS 1,030 951 -7.7
other 2,144 1,087 -49.3
local government
education 1,027 818 -20.4
social services 256 288 + 12.4
construction 125 86 -31.2
police 182 201 + 10.4
other 741 662 -10.7
total 5,831 4,343 -25.5




























































































It may be that public-sector productivity growth, notoriously difficult 
to measure, has made it possible to provide the same level of services with 
fewer employees, but it is hard to believe that labor force reductions of the 
scale that we observe in Australia, Finland and Sweden, let alone the U.K., 
do not translate into less public welfare provision. And, again, increased 
societal needs must be taken into account. In view of the societal changes 
identified earlier, the figures presented in Tables 4 and 5 would appear to 
represent a broad-based reduction of service-based welfare effort.
Stephens, Huber and Ray (1996) suggest that the deceleration of 
government spending growth might be viewed, in part, as a result of the 
maturation of welfare state—the fact that they now provide for basic needs 
and have perhaps also reached the limits of politically acceptable taxation. 
Clearly, the growth of government spending as a percentage of GDP must 
inevitably slow down over time. However, there is hardly any correlation, on 
a cross-national basis, between annual growth of the public-sector labor 
force in 1989-94 and 1990 levels of government employment, measured as a 
percentage of total employment (r=-.142). The correlation of annual growth 
rates of final government consumption in 1979-89 and 1985 levels is also 
weak (r=-.226). In explaining the deceleration of public-sector expansion in 
the 1980s, economic and possibly political developments that are exogenous 
to the process of public sector expansion, and yet affect all OECD countries, 
must be taken into account. It is not the case that countries with large public 
sectors have experienced more deceleration (or greater public-sector 
cutbacks) than other countries.
Assessing Entitlement Changes
Pierson begins Dismantling the welfare state? (1994:13-17) by 
distinguishing between "programmatic" and "systemic" retrenchment (pp. . 
While systemic retrenchment entails long-term changes in the political 
environment which make the welfare state vulnerable to future attacks, 
programmatic retrenchment includes reductions in spending or benefit levels 
and tightening eligibility requirements. Programmatic retrenchment also 
seems to include shifting to means tests to determine eligibility, and 
increasing the role of the private sector. Clearly, the extent of programmatic 
retrenchment cannot be gauged from aggregate measures of government 
spending alone. As Pierson (19%: 159) notes, "major changes in the 
spending for particular programs could be occurring within these broad 
categories," and " policy reforms could have imposed lagged cutbacks that 
do not [yet] show up in spending figures."
In this section, we review and update Pierson's four case studies. We 
argue that Pierson's own account of British social policy developments 
belies his claim that the Thatcher governments of the 1980s failed to achieve 
a significant rollback of the welfare state. For the 1980s, the other cases 




























































































provided by social assistance programs deteriorated steadily in the U.S. and, 
more recently, these programs have been dismantled or profoundly 
restructured. In the Swedish case and, to a lesser extent, the German case as 
well, the politics of austerity in the 1990s have been accompanied by benefit 
cutbacks and programmatic reforms.
Pierson's account of programmatic retrenchment in the U K. focuses 
on three primary issue areas—pensions, income support, and housing—but 
also encompasses two supplemental issue areas—sickness/disability support 
and health care. Summarizing his analysis, Pierson (1994:142-146) 
characterizes retrenchment in pensions and housing as "high." retrenchment 
in income support programs and health care as "low," and retrenchment in 
sickness/disability benefits as "low/moderate." Thus the Thatcher regime 
apparently achieved significant retrenchment in only two of the five areas of 
welfare state provision on which Pierson reports. However, the criteria 
behind this coding of retrenchment outcomes are not spelled out very 
clearly, and the coding strikes us as dubious in several instances (cf. Alber 
1996).
In particular, Pierson's characterization of retrenchment in British 
income support seems to have little to do with the actual level of benefits 
across the types of transfers that he covers. Pierson acknowledges that the 
income replacement provided by public unemployment insurance was 
sharply reduced and eligibility for unemployment benefits was restricted in 
1980s. Also, he acknowledges that the real value of the universal child 
benefit fell by 14% from 1979 to 89 as a result of government decisions not 
provide for full indexation (Pierson 1994:109). Pierson suggests the 
expansion of the means-tested Family Credit, an income supplement to the 
working poor, offset cuts in other areas of income support, but in the context 
of mass unemployment, it seems reasonable discount the impact of work- 
based benefits in offsetting cuts in support for children, the unemployed and 
the poor. Moreover, the expansion of the Family Credit allowance 
constitutes a shift in resources toward a means tested program, which fits 
one of Pierson's criteria for programmatic retrenchment.
Pierson is correct to point out that public health care spending has 
steadily increased in real terms since 1981 and that the 1990 reform of the 
NHS preserved publicly financed care. There is a lot more to the story of 
health care, however. Most informed observers believe that, despite real 
growth, NHS spending fell well short of increases in demand for health care 
in the 1980s, resulting in substantial shortages of care in some parts of the 
country. While fees and charges in the NHS increased from 1.9% of total 
spending in 1979 to 3.2% in 1994, the role of private enterprise within the 
health care sector increased considerably under Thatcher and Major. To be 
discussed further below, the introduction o. market mechanisms into the 
NHS has been associated with a sharp increase in transactions costs: 
management staff increased from 6,091 in 1990 to 20,478 in 1993 




























































































increased fees, distorted priorities, and creeping privatization warrants a less 
sanguine assessment.
Turning to the U.S. experience, the absence of any significant cuts in 
social security and Medicare benefits lends support to the resilience thesis, 
but Pierson's characterization of income support as an instance of low 
retrenchment is again questionable. Jens Alber's (1996) analysis shows that 
the maximum Food Stamps benefit stagnated in real terms and fell in 
relation to earnings during the Reagan and Bush years. Alber also shows that 
the percentage of poor households receiving AFDC benefits fell sharply in 
the early 1980's and never regained its previous levels. With state 
governments setting the "standard of need" that determined eligibility for 
AFDC benefits, the standard of need for a family of three fell, in the median 
state, from 90% of the poverty line in 1970 to 59% in 1992. At the same 
time, the maximum benefit for such a family fell from 67% to 36% of the 
poverty line (Alber 1996).
The drive to reduce anti-poverty spending in the U.S. was capped by 
the welfare reform signed by President Clinton in July, 1996. This bill cut 
Food Stamp benefits by $24 billion, denied immigrants eligibility for Food 
Stamps, restricted social security eligibility for disabled immigrants and 
children, and cut federal funding for social services and child nutrition 
programs. Most importantly, however, it replaced AFDC with block grants 
to the states, with no minimum requirements pertaining to either eligibility 
or benefit levels, but mandating a five-year lifetime limit on receipt of 
benefits and requiring 50% of each state's caseload to be working for 
benefits by 2002. Cushioned by economic growth, the distributive 
consequences of this reform are still considerably. At the time that the 
reform was passed, the Urban Institute estimated that it would result in some 
income loss for 11 million families, and move 2.6 million people, including 
1.1 million children, into poverty (Edelman 1997:46).
Pierson’s overall assessment of the U.S. case must surely be qualified 
in light the 1996 welfare reform. At the same time, resilience remains a 
conspicuous feature of more universalistic welfare programs ("middle-class 
entitlements") in the U.S. By contrast, the benefit cuts introduced by 
Swedish governments since 1990 have been spread more or less evenly 
across the entire range of entitlement programs. In Sweden, like many other 
countries, government efforts to reduce the fiscal burden of welfare 
programs initially took the form of changes in the system of indexation, 
loosening the linkage between welfare benefits, on the one hand, and 
consumer prices and market wages, on the other, but savings realized 
through this mechanism proved insufficient. Through a series of piecemeal 
changes, which began before the bourgeois parties came to power in 1991, 
the replacement levels provided by the system of sick pay insurance were 
reduced from 90% to 75-80% of wages. In addition, the bourgeois parties cut 
the replacement rate of unemployment insurance from 90% to 80%, and 




























































































While the replacement rates of parental leave insurance have been similarly 
cut, the general child allowance was reduced by 15% in 1995. Needs-based 
housing subsidies and supplementary allowances for families with more than 
one child have also been cut (Ringqvist 1996 and Stephens 1996).
As of 1993, the funding of public health care is being partially shifted 
onto employee-paid payroll taxes. At the same time, fees charged for 
doctor's visits and co-payments for medications have increased sharply over 
the last 10 years. Also, the sick pay reform of 1991 shifted responsibility for 
the first fourteen days of sick pay to employers, creating an incentive for 
employers to reduce absenteeism by improving the workplace environment 
and/or by monitoring employees to prevent abuse of sick pay provisions. In 
Esping-Andersen's (1990) analytical framework, this reform, which 
reinforces workers' dependence on their employers, must be considered a 
step in the direction of "recommodification." Probably of greater long-term 
significance, the principles of pension reform agreed by the major political 
parties prior to the 1994 election provides for shifting the financing of the 
supplementary pension system (ATP) towards employee contributions (the 
current system being based entirely on employer contributions) and the 
introduction of privately-managed individual retirements accounts (to 
receive 2% of total contributions).
Of the four countries surveyed by Pierson, Germany provides the 
strongest and most consistent support for his emphasis on welfare-state 
resilience, but even here some qualifications might be in order. Like the 
Swedish welfare state, the German welfare state remained intact through the 
1980s. As Alber (1996) shows, the real value of both pension benefits and 
social assistance grants fell in the late 1970's and early 1980’s; yet each 
program subsequently recovered lost ground and, in marked contrast to U.S. 
income-support programs, benefit levels grew in line with average earnings 
from the mid- 1980's through the mid-1990’s. The process of German 
unification initially served to boost social spending, but its long-term fiscal 
consequences, combined with the Maastricht criteria for monetary union, 
precipitated the adoption of a series of austerity measures in 1994-96, 




























































































From the analytical perspective of most of the welfare state literature, 
summing up changes in individual social programs hardly provides an 
adequate basis for assessing the extent to which welfare states have changed, 
for this literature is centrally concerned with relations among social 
programs or, in other words, the overall configuration of welfare states. One 
interpretation of Esping-Andersen's (1990) work holds that all welfare states 
consist of three basic components—a universalistic component providing 
benefits as a matter of citizen rights, a social insurance component linking 
benefits to employment, and a means-tested social assistance component— 
and welfare-state types are essentially distinguished from each other by the 
relative weight that they assign to these three components. The question 
becomes whether significant shifts in the mix of welfare-state components 
has occurred over the last 15-20 years. Showing the distribution of total 
social spending by type of spending in 1980 and 1992, Table 6 represents a 
first stab at this question.
The Changing Composition of Social Spending
Table 6. The distribution of social spending by type: Sweden, Germany, the 






SWEDEN 1980 27.7% 13.0% 9.9% 49.4%
1993 15.9 16.4 13.1 54.6
GERMANY 1980 25.4 3.3 12.0 59.3
1993 26.8 3.1 10.9 59.2
UK 1980 28.4 5.9 19.5 46.3
1993 25.9 4.7 28.4 41.0
USA 1980 25.5 3.1 20.7 50.7
1993 31.5 1.8 21.8 44.9
Sources:
Health expenditures: OECD ( 1994b, 1996c); 
Social services and total transfers: OECD (1996c); 




























































































In the Swedish and British cases alike, we observe two important 
changes: first, a shift of social spending from services to transfer payments and, 
secondly, a shift of spending on transfers from social insurance schemes to 
social assistance. The former shift is particularly pronounced in the Swedish 
case, and the latter is most pronounced in the British case. In the case of the 
U.S., we observe that the relative importance of public health spending rose at 
the expense of social insurance, confirming that rising health-care costs has 
been a major factor behind the continued growth of social spending. In a 
European context, the increased relative importance of health spending would 
represent an increase in the "service intensity" of the welfare state, but in the 
U.S., of course, public health spending primarily takes the form of transfer 
payments. Consistent with our earlier discussion, Germany stands out in Table 6 
as a case of remarkable stability.
It should be noted that the spending figures in Table 6 do not fit 
Esping-Andersen's conceptual categories perfectly. While transfer payments 
may be provided on a universalistic basis rather than being tied to 
employment, services may be provided on a means-tested basis. Recognizing 
the limitations of the such aggregate data, Table 6 lends at least some 
support to the idea that the Swedish welfare state has become institutionally 
more like the German welfare state, and the British welfare state has become 
more like the American welfare state (cf. Iversen and Pontusson 1997). 
Based on this limited sample of OECD countries, it would appear that 
universalistic service-based welfare states have undergone more far-reaching 
changes than social-insurance or residualist welfare states. Yet the trajectory 
of change in the Swedish and British cases is clearly different, suggesting 
that partisan politics still matter.
Reforms of the Public Sector
Exemplified by Pierson's work, the literature on welfare-state retrenchment 
tends to focus on the extent to which entitlements have be been cut and, by 
extension, on transfer programs rather than welfare state activities that 
involve the direct provision of services. With respect to services, 
entitlements are typically less clear-cut and less clearly articulated. Since the 
Second World War, British citizens have been entitled to free health care, 
but the precise meaning of this entitlement-the quality of the health care 
provided by the state—has changed significantly over time. The emphasis on 
entitlements/transfers in the existing literature is closely related to the 
emphasis on welfare-state resilience, for in most countries government 
spending on social security transfers has grown more rapidly than final 




























































































So far, our discussion of the public sector has focused on quantitative 
measures of its size. Before we conclude, a qualitative dimension must be 
added to our treatment of this question. Across the OECD area, we observe 
important changes in the organization of the public sector and how it 
delivers services to its "customers" over the last decade or so. In this section, 
we briefly review public-sector reforms in Sweden and the U.K., and address 
their distributive implications. It should be noted at the outset that in neither 
of these cases have public-sector reforms specifically targeted welfare 
activities. Rather, organizational changes within health care, elderly care, 
social work, etc. have been part of a broader process of restructuring the 
public sector. In this area, as in many others, it is difficult to discuss "the 
welfare state" in isolation, as if it were a detachable appendix of "the modern 
state."
In Sweden, the social democrats established a new ministry 
(Civildepartementet) to oversee public-sector reform in the early 1980s. The 
original goal of this effort was to improve the delivery of public services by 
reducing bureaucracy, granting local providers considerable autonomy and 
increasing popular participation (Premfors 1991; cf. also Fudge and 
Gustafsson 1989). Since the late 1980's, however, public-sector reform has 
emphasized cost reduction and encouraged private-sector competition in 
some areas. In both phases of public-sector reform, increased autonomy for 
administrative agencies and local governments has been accompanied by 
new forms of accountability to the central government, which has 
increasingly stipulated desired outputs and budgetary constraints, but left 
managers to determine how to deploy the organization's resources. To 
encourage long term improvements in efficiency, the government also began 
to allow unit managers to retain an share of user fees in the 1980s. 
Exemplifying a general trend among OECD countries, the administrative 
mechanisms of the Swedish welfare state increasingly mimic those of private 
corporations (cf. Schwartz 1995).
The Postal Service and several other "commercial slai -vies" 
(affarsverk). relying on fees as their primary source of income, were 
reconstituted as state-owned corporations in 1985-95 and thus moved off the 
government budget altogether. As commercial state agencies and state- 
owned corporations alike undertook extensive rationalization measures and a 
number of state-owned corporations were privatized, employment in the 
state enterprise sector I II from 330,000 in 1980 to 210,000 in 1994 
(Ringqvist 1996:78). The social democratic approach to privatization clearly 
excluded welfare-related services, but during the bourgeois coalition 
government of 1991, a number of legislative measures were enacted that 




























































































were not reversed when the social democrats returned to power in 1994. 
While state subsidies are now available for private childcare and education 
on a restricted basis, the so-called "house doctor" system has introduced an 
element of private practice into health care. From 1988 to 1994, private 
employment increased from 1% to 5% in child care, and from 6% to 7% in 
health care (Ringqvist 1996:106).
Swedish privatization has been strictly limited by comparison to the 
British case. In the U.K., the labor force of nationalized industry fell from 
1.8 million in 1979 to less half a million in 1997 (Colling and Ferner 
1995:493). The introduction market mechanisms into the realm of publicly 
financed social services and the promotion of private-sector competition has 
also been quite comprehensive. In contrast to Sweden, the effort to shrink 
and marketize the state led Britain's conservative governments to increase 
central government control over local governments and other units. At the 
same time, the civil service has been subject to a series of reforms intended 
to reduce staffing levels, to increase managerial flexibility, and to make 
departmental "cost centers" more responsible for financial performance. 
These reforms culminated in the Next Steps program, which moved 
executive functions out of the ministries into agencies with clear targets and 
responsibilities (Winchester and Bach 1995:311-312).
Of more immediate relevance to our present concerns, the Tories 
introduced market principles into the National Health Service and the state 
education system for England and Wales in the late 1980s. In both fields of 
production, authority for budgetary and personnel decisions were devolved 
to unit-level managers. NHS hospitals were converted to "trusts" and now 
have the status of public corporations, with the ability to borrow 
independently for capital expenditure and to retain operating surpluses. 
General practitioners may now opt out of the NHS and establishing a fund­
holding practice to which the central government allocates a budget. Fund­
holding GP's, hospital trusts, and health authorities are expected to contract 
independently for the services they require (Winchester and Bach 1995:312- 
314). Schools have also been given the possibility of opting out of local 
government control to become Grant Maintained, receiving funding directly 
from the central government. While school principals have gained 
responsibility for personnel and budgetary decisions, parents have gained the 
right to choose schools for their children. School and hospital budgets are 
now largely determined by the number of students and patients they attract, 
increasing the incentives for unit managers to economize on costs.
The Tories also sought to increase private provision of education and 




























































































insurance premiums. From 1979 to 1991, the number of private health 
insurance policy holders increased from 1 million to 3 million (The 
Economist. June 6, 1992). By compelling unit level managers to subject 
stipulated contracts to an open bidding procedure referred to as Compulsory' 
Competitive Tendering, the government also encouraged private competition 
in hospital cleaning, catering and laundry services as well as local 
government services. While private spending increased from 5.1% to 10.1% 
of total health care spending, private employment increased from 15.9% to 
39.6% of total health care employment over the period 1979-1994. In 
education, private spending increased from 7.4% to 12.9% and private 
employment from 7.3% to 38.2% over the same period (Hills 1995:31, CSO 
1995:17).
In Sweden and the 1' K. alike, public-sector restructuring has involved 
a sustained effort to decentialize wage-setting mechanisms within the public 
sector so as to allow unit managers to respond more effectively to local labor 
market conditions and to incorporate productivity-enhancing incentives into 
their pay systems.7 More or less explicitly, governments in both countries 
have also sought to hold back public-sector wages relative to private-sector 
wages. The significance of the decentralization of wage-setting within the 
public sector should be seen against the background that, in both countries, 
public-sector wage bargaining took on a particularly solidaristic cast from 
the late 1960s onwards. With public-sector wage compression putting 
pressure on private employers to raise the relative wages of unskilled 
workers, especially women, the expansion of public-sector employment 
contributed to the decline of overall wage inequality in this period 
(Pontusson 1998, Rueda and Pontusson, 1997).
As Table 7 indicates, aggregate wage dispersion remained more or 
less constant in the British public sector while it rose steadily in the private 
sector from 1984 to 1995. However, significant dispersion occurred among 
both men and women working in the public sector. In the course of the 
1980s, the dynamics of public-sector wage setting became distinctly less 
solidaristic, and there is every reason to believe that this change is, in part, 
attributable to market-oriented reforms. At the same time, of course, public- 
sector employment cutbacks and privatization have served to shift labor from 
the public sector (with more compressed wage differentials) to the private 
sector (with less compressed wage differentials). More fragmentary data 
published by the OECD (1995:48) indicates that public-sector wage 
differentials in Sweden increased as well in the early 1990s. Arguably, then, 
the welfare state has not only failed to keep up with rising market inequality 





























































































Table 7. Wage dispersion (90-10 ratios) among public and private 



























Note: see Table 1 for an explanation of 90-10 ratios. 
Source: New earnings survey (various editions).
The question of how market-oriented reforms of the public sector have 
affected quality of services and equality of access is of central importance, 
but there is very little systematic evidence on this score and it is virtually 
impossible to separate the effects of marketization from the effects of 
cutbacks. While consumer choice has been the focus of much of the rhetoric 
in support of public-sector reforms, critics of Thatcherism argue that 
marketization has undermined universal access to high quality services by 
generating both regional and status tiers within the welfare state. The fact 
that an increasing number of middle-class Britons rely on private alternatives 
to free public services is indicative of quality deterioration and, at the same 
time, a source of inequality. According to the well-respected King's Fund 
Institute, patients of fundholding GP's routinely receive preferential 





























































































Though citizens' willingness to pay taxes obviously vary depending on 
political circumstances, there is surely something to the idea that the overall 
level of taxation has reached its upper limits in many OECD countries. At 
the same time, the combination of sluggish productivity growth and mass 
unemployment since the late 1970s has meant that government revenues at a 
given rate of taxation have grown more slowly than they did in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the internationalization of financial markets has increased the 
costs associated with deficit spending. Together, these factors have put 
downward pressure on overall government spending.
The evidence presented above suggests that, generally speaking, 
government consumption and employment have been more affected than 
entitlement programs by the new fiscal constraints. The fact that some 
welfare states have become less service-oriented can partly be explained in 
terms of demographic changes and the maturation of social insurance 
systems (specifically, the extension of full pension benefits to all retired 
people). Typically, final government consumption expenditure continued to 
grow through the 1980s, it simply grew less mpidly than spending on social 
secii'i' transfers. However, it would also appear to be the case that 
govt, ,cnts have preferred cutting the public sector over cutting 
entitlement programs, and it is first and foremost the service components of 
welfare states that have been reformed according to market principles. This 
pattern of retrenchment and restructuring does not seem to sit well with 
Pierson’s assessment of the political risks entailed when politicians 
challenged entrenched interests, following from the common public choice 
argument that concentrated interests generally prevail over diffuse interests, 
for public-sector employees constitute the entrenched pro-welfare 
constituency par excellence.
What, then, accounts for the "anti-service bias" of welfare state 
retrenchment? Several arguments seem plausible. Consistent with Pierson's 
emphasis on the politics of blame avoidance, one might argue that the effects 
of cutting the public sector are less immediate and less tangible (or less 
visible) than the effects of cutting entitlement programs. Public-sector 
cutbacks will likely result in quality deterioration and this might in turn 
result in "middle-class opt-out," but quality deterioration will not necessarily 
be proportionate to spending cuts and no one knows at which point "middle- 
class opt-out" becomes a serious problem. Even social democratic politicians 
are likely to find the risks involved here more palatable than those involved 




























































































Secondly, the popular legitimacy of programs based on the social 
insurance principle might be invoked to explain the anti-service bias of 
recent cutbacks. As Esping-Andersen (1996b) argues with reference to the 
welfare states of continental Europe, the consensual manner in which such 
programs were developed and the sense of entitlement which the insurance 
system produces, make it very difficult to reform these transfer programs. 
Thirdly, the preference for social insurance welfarism may reflect anxieties 
about further European integration, in so far as EU legislation prevents 
discrimination on the basis of nationality. Since social-insurance benefits are 
typically based on income from employment, such programs sidestep the 
political problem of foreigners taking advantage of generous benefits.
Most importantly perhaps, the patterns of retrenchment we have 
documented might be seen as a response to political pressure from a cross­
class coalition of employers and workers in the export and multinational 
sectors. Both Peter Swenson (1991) and Herman Schwartz (1994) argue that 
with increased openness and intensified international competition, exposed- 
sector workers and employers become acutely concerned to contain the 
upward pressure on domestic costs generated by large public sectors. In this 
context, a new political-economic cleavage between sheltered and exposed 
sectors opens up and the exposed-sector coalition exerts increasing pressure 
for public-sector reform. From our perspective, it is important to recognize 
that this coalition is based on compromise among its constituent units rather 
than a complete convergence of interests. Left to their own devices, export- 
oriented employers would probably have favored across-the-board cuts in 
the welfare state, but the maintenance of basic social insurance entitlements 
is a condition for private-sector unions to support public-sector cutbacks and 
reforms.
This coalitional account works better for some countries than for 
others. In the British case, electoral support for Thatcherism certainly had a 
broad cross-class character, but Mrs. Thatcher's efforts to restructure the 
public sector did not involve the cooperation of private-sector unions, and 
the major source of business support came from the financial sector rather 
than export-oriented manufacturers. The British case would have to be 
couched in terms of a cross-class coalition centered on financial interests, 
including the financial interests of working-class homeowners and 
shareholders, and forged electorally rather than organizationally.
Thinking about public-sector restructuring in these terms, it is 
important to underscore that market-oriented reforms have had different 
consequences for different segments of the public-sector labor force. In the 




























































































blue-collar workers fell from 1.05 in 1984 to .98 in 1995, but the public- 
private ratio for white-collar workers remained stable at 1.09-1.10 (New 
Earnings Survey, various editions). This divergence of fortunes helps explain 
why public-sector unions were not able to mobilize more effective resistance 
to market-oriented reforms.
As noted earlier, Pierson distinguishes between programmatic and 
systemic retrenchment in his analysis of Thatcherism and Reaganism. While 
programmatic retrenchment refers to reductions in spending or benefit 
levels, the introduction of means-testing, etc., systemic retrenchment entails 
long-term changes in the political environment making the welfare state 
vulnerable to future attacks. Pierson points to four potential kinds of 
systemic retrenchment: turning public opinion against the welfare state, 
defunding the welfare state via tax cuts, institutional changes which 
undermine opposition access to decision-making, and weakening pro­
welfare state interest groups. According to Pierson (1994.1 16-161), the 
Reagan administrations achieved significant systemic retrenchment by 
means of defunding the welfare state, but very little, if any, systemic 
retrenchment occurred in the U.K. during Mrs. Thatcher's tenure as Prime 
Minister. Pierson points out that popular support for the welfare state, 
especially the NHS, actually increased in the course of the 1980s and argues 
that the same holds for the fiscal position of the state. Also, he argues that 
there have been no institutional changes which weaken either welfare state 
proponents or reduce their access to decision making. Hence there is no 
reason to expect more successful attacks social programs in the future.
Pierson is certainly correct about British public opinion surveys. And 
yet it seems odd to suggest that they evince a bulwark of popular opposition 
to further retrenchment given the paltry electoral benefits Labour's 
commitment to increasing welfare state spending yielded in the 1980's and 
early 1990's. Arguably, Labour's recent landslide victory was a result of the 
leadership's embrace of small government, low taxation, and strict limits for 
public spending. From the perspective adopted here, the fact that Pierson's 
discussion of systemic retrenchment in the U.K. does not even mention the 
impact of Thatcherite policies on public-sector unions represents a serious 
shortcoming. In the 1960s and 1970s, unionized public-sector employees 
emerged as a key political constituency for the Labour Party and the welfare 
state. The cutbacks and restructuring described above have clearly weakened 
the market power of public-sector unions and their ability to mobilize 
politically. In some instances, market-oriented reforms have also created 
incentives for them to eschew "political unionism" in favor of a more 




























































































As public-sector employees constitute a key constituency of Left 
parties in most countries, the idea that public-sector reform represents a form 
of systemic retrenchment as well as programmatic retrenchment would seem 
to be more broadly applicable. Despite the absence strong political figures, 
like Thatcher and Reagan, attacking the welfare state rhetorically, political 
and economic conditions in the second half of the 1990s are surely more 
favorable to welfare-state cutbacks and restructuring than they were in the 
second half of the 1980s (cf. Van Kersbergen 1997). In Western Europe, this 
is also, in some measure, a result of the constraints imposed by the 
Maastricht criteria for monetary union. Whether the current contractionary 
environment represents a transitional phase or a more permanent condition 






























































































1. Pierson's article builds on a previous book (Pierson 1996), analyzing the Thatcher and 
Reagan experiments in detail. Other comparative analyses emphasizing the resilience of 
welfare states include Stephens, Huber and Ray (1995), Swank (1997) and Garrett (1997). 
See Alber (1996) for a detailed critique of Pierson's work and Van Kersbergen (1997) for a 
comprehensive review of recent welfare state literature.
2. In our view, the importance of services relative to transfer payments constitutes the most 
obvious basis for distinguishing among "institutional welfare states" (cf. Esping-Andersen 
1996a, and Swank 1997). Esping-Andersen's (1990) concept of "decommodification'’ partly 
captures, but also blurs this distinction. Scoring very high on Esping-Andersen's 
"decommodification" index, the Scandinavian welfare states have traditionally promoted 
labor force participation and strengthened the power of wage-earners as sellers of labor power 
(rather than reducing dependence on the sale of labor power).
3. It is sometimes argued that the fundamental purpose of the welfare stale is to provide for 
social security, and that only some welfare states (in the first instance, the Scandinavian 
welfare states) have had redistributive ambitions as well. While welfare states clearly vary in 
their redistributive effects, we find this argument somewhat dubious: since some groups are 
far more insecure than others in a capitalist society, the public provision of social security is 
itself a redistributive activity.
4. Of course, the percentage of the population receiving social assistance might also increase 
because of political decisions to broaden the coverage of social assistance programs or to cut 
the benefits provided by more universalhtic welfare programs.
5. Henceforth our discussion will focus on Pierson's four country cases. Though Pierson does 
not explicitly discuss case selection, it seems clear that these cases were chosen so as to 
provide fot the representation of Esping-Andersen's (1990) three types of welfare states, with 
Sweden exemplifying the social democratic type, Germany the conservative type, and the 
U.S. the liberal type. The U K. is a special case, which does not fit neatly into Esping- 
Andersen's typology: for Pierson and for us, it represents a limiting case of nco l '1* tal reform 
of the welfare state since 1980. Nowhere Hse has the neo-liberal agenda been pursued more 
rigorously and under more favorable i in u.n uances.
6. Because of definitional changes, the Swedish data on total social spending from 1980 
onwards are not comparable to pre-1980 data. Therefore, we include 1979 data, and compare 
1980-92 with 1967-79.
7. See Marsden (1993) and OECD (1995) for OECD-wide surveys of changing pay practices 
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